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Abstract 
In their commentaries on Hagger (2019), Gardner, Rebar, and Lally (2019) and Phillips (2019) 
provide welcome debate on the conceptualization and operation of habits in physical activity. In this 
response, I extend their comments by (i) calling for a redefining of habits to encompass contemporary 
views of habit, and (ii) suggesting that descriptions of physical activity habits should make reference to 
their relations with other implicit constructs that reflect automatic processes. Specifically, I contend that 
extant definitions of habits for complex behaviors like physical activity should move away from 
definitions of unitary responses to specific cues or contexts, and, focus on ‘macro’ expressions of the 
behavior that comprise multiple sub-actions, which can each be controlled by habitual or deliberative 
processing. It may also be useful for definitions to make the distinction between habitual instigation and 
execution, affording greater precision in descriptions of the processes that generate habitual behaviors. 
Finally, physical activity habits as cue-action relations are unlikely to be enacted in the absence of 
activation of other implicit processes, consistent with behavioral schema. Recognizing this, I contend 
that descriptions of habit should accommodate these links, and that they may be useful in elaborating on 
the processes by which habits determine subsequent physical activity behavior. 
 
Keywords: behavioral automaticity; habitual behaviors; automatic processes; dual-process theories; 
behavioral schema 
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Redefining Habits and Linking Habits with Other Implicit Processes 
Phillips’ (2019) and Gardner, Rebar, and Lally’s (2019) commentaries on my review of habits in 
physical activity (Hagger, 2019) have provided welcome debate on the definitions and 
operationalization of key concepts and mechanisms relevant to understanding habitual behaviors in this 
domain. Common to both commentaries is the importance of clarifying the defining characteristics of 
habit (e.g., viewing habits as a construct or behavioral impulse, defining habitual actions as a hierarchy 
of higher- and lower-order actions and sub-actions), and the distinction between different types of 
habitual acting (e.g., habitual instigation and execution). Related to these points, both authors challenge 
the view of strictly characterizing habitual behaviors as an exclusively automatic process, and suggest 
that habits for complex behaviors like physical activity often comprise blends of sub-actions, some of 
which are controlled by non-conscious, automatic processes, and others controlled by reasoned, 
deliberative processes, consistent with contemporary views of action derived from dual process models. 
In this response I contribute to this debate by (i) suggesting that definitions of habits should be revised 
to reflect the relativist view of complex habitual behaviors as blends of sub-actions each under 
deliberative or habitual control; and, (ii) proposing that descriptions of physical activity habits should 
make reference to relations of habits with constructs that reflect other automatic, non-conscious 
processes that determine behavior, and call for research that explores the extent to which these analogs 
of automatic processes coincide. 
Redefining Definitions of Habits 
A key issue emerging from contemporary research on habits in the physical activity domain, 
which was also lucidly highlighted in the commentaries (Gardner et al., 2019; Phillips, 2019), is the 
extent to which, and the ways in which, habitual behaviors are controlled by automatic, non-conscious 
processes. Because definitions of habits place considerable emphasis on the non-conscious, automatic 
characteristic, it often engenders the false belief that habitual behaviors, insofar as they are global 
actions observed at the ‘macro’ level, are exclusively controlled by such processes. However, 
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developments in theory on habit have made it clear that complex behaviors like physical activity are 
unlikely to be exclusively controlled by non-conscious processes1. Such behaviors involve multiple 
sub-actions and strategic sequencing of those actions in order for the observed behavior at the ‘macro’ 
level to be performed. It is, therefore, unlikely that the behavior and all its sub-actions are performed 
automatically and non-consciously. As Phillips (2019) suggests, “to enact… a complex health behavior 
without conscious awareness is unlikely in the extreme, and no data exists to show exercising can be 
done without conscious awareness of one’s actions” (p. 8). This is echoed by other authors. For 
example, Wood (2017), invoking the distinction between reasoned, deliberative decision making and 
automatic, non-conscious processes proposed in dual process models of behavior (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Hagger, 2016; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006), suggests that “any dualist comparison between 
acting on habit versus acting on deliberate thought is overly simplistic. Many behaviors… are complex 
and probably draw on both memory systems” (p. 393). 
The notion, advocated by Gardner et al. (2016; 2019) and Phillips (2019), that complex 
behaviors are a blend of behaviors that are consciously enacted and automatic processes has utility in 
advancing theoretical understanding on habits, and is consistent with research evidence (Botvinick & 
Plaut, 2006; Clegg, DiGirolamo, & Keele, 1998; Graybiel, 2008; Savalia, Shukla, & Bapi, 2016). For 
example, research has shown that, over time, experience of executing a behavior in the presence of 
relevant contextual features or cues, which could be external or internal to the individual, as Phillips 
(2019) so eloquently argues, will lead to a gradual transition from conscious to automatic control 
(Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 2010). Of course, this does not mean that the behavior becomes 
entirely controlled non-consciously, rather that some aspects of performing the behavior become less 
 
1It is important to note that many everyday behaviors could be considered complex from this analytic perspective. As 
Gardner (2015) points out, “there is a disconnect between these relatively complex behaviours and the simple actions that 
have been the focus of investigation within other sub-disciplines of psychology” such as research by behaviorists, which 
tends to focus on simple behaviors like “pulling strings and lifting latches”, and research by neuroscientists that continues to 
“investigate habit through observations of key presses, lever pushes and simple object selection tasks” (p. 281). From this 
perspective, therefore, even relatively mundane actions like getting dressed or making a cup of tea should be considered 
complex, and can be broken down into sets of sub-actions that could vary in the extent to which they are controlled by 
automatic or conscious processes. 
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reliant or dependent on conscious, deliberative control with control shifting toward non-conscious, 
automatic processes. For example, if one were to conduct a ‘meso’ or ‘micro’ level analysis of the sub-
actions that comprise the performance of a particular physical activity, it is possible that some will still 
be consciously determined and others controlled by automatic processes. For example, sets of actions 
required for the ‘macro-level’ observable behavior of ‘going cycling’ is likely to require identifying an 
appropriate time, evaluating feasibility (e.g., weather traffic conditions), assembling necessary kit and 
getting changed, collecting bike, riding the bike out of the driveway, and so on. And these sub-actions 
can be broken down into further sub-actions. Each of these sub-actions may be controlled by conscious, 
deliberative, or habitual, automatic processes. If sufficient sub-actions that comprise the behavior 
observed at the ‘macro’ level come under automatic control, then the ‘net’ effect will be for the 
behavior to experienced as habitual. 
Similarly, the distinction between habitual instigation or initiation and habitual execution is also 
helpful for describing the processes controlling performance of complex behaviors, and chimes well 
with evidence and anecdotal experience (Gardner et al., 2016; Gardner et al., 2019; Phillips, 2019; 
Phillips & Gardner, 2016). Complex behaviors like physical activity not only require strategic 
coordination of sets of sub-actions to perform, but also considerable planning, forethought, and decision 
making to instigate in the first place. As an individual develops a habit for that behavior, the high effort 
and costly deliberation involved in the decision to perform the behavior is likely to become less so. For 
example, having undergone all the thought processes involved in the decision to go to the gym (e.g., 
weighing up the costs and benefits of doing so; identifying the time, place, clothes, partner, and 
equipment required) on multiple occasions, an individual is likely to become less dependent on such 
deliberation and make such decisions extremely rapidly and efficiently based on stored representations 
of the behavior. This shift is likely manifested in the habitual instigation of the behavior – the decision 
to act will be arrived at in a rapid, efficient manner. The enactment of the behavior itself may still 
require planning and conscious decisions to execute, but the decision itself bears the hallmarks of a 
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habit. Habitual instigation, therefore, focuses on habitual ‘decision making’ or formation of a 
commitment to action (Gardner et al., 2019), as opposed to the habitual enactment of the chain of sub-
actions that comprise the behavior observed at the ‘macro’ level. Of course, some of the sub-actions 
involved in the execution of the behavior may also shift in control from deliberative to automatic 
processing, and if the ‘net’ control over sub-actions shifts toward automatic control the execution of the 
behavior will be experienced as habitual. This is corroborated by research that has demonstrated that 
health behaviors, including physical activity, are experienced as ‘more habitual’ as experience with 
making the decision and enacting the behavior increases (Lally et al., 2010). This perspective also 
entails that the opposite can happen – that changes in the context may lead to some sub-actions that 
form part of a behavioral sequence to shift from habitual to deliberative control, consistent with the 
habit discontinuity hypothesis (Verplanken, Roy, & Whitmarsh, 2018). Taken together, these proposals 
provide a more nuanced view of habitual behaviors and the processes involved in developing habits for 
complex behaviors. 
As a behavior develops as a habit, just as some sub-actions that make up the ‘macro’ behavior 
become less controlled by conscious processes, so the experience of the behavior as one that is 
deliberatively controlled may shift. People will likely be aware of their actions and behavior, but also 
note changes in the extent to which the behavior requires deliberative, effortful control. This is likely to 
be reflected in meta-cognitive measures like the self-report habit index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), 
which ask people to reflect on the extent to which their behavior is determined by automatic processes 
(e.g., “Physical activity X is something I do without thinking”). Although sometimes individuals may 
not have complete access to the processes that control their behavior, and may sometimes erroneously 
attribute control over their behavior to one process or another (Hagger, Rebar, Mullan, Lipp, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2015), generalized shifts in experience are likely to reasonably track generalized shifts 
in relative control from deliberative (slow, time-costly, considerable processing required) to automatic 
(fast, efficient, less processing required). Recently, Gardner et al. (2016) have modified these scales to 
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track reflections on habitual instigation (e.g., “Deciding to do physical activity X is something I do 
without thinking”) and execution (e.g., “Once I have decided to do physical activity X, it is something I 
do without thinking”) of habits. These inventories may, therefore, be appropriate to capture the extent to 
which, and the ways in which, the balance in the control over the behavior or, more accurately, the 
multiple sub-behaviors that comprise the behavior, has shifted from conscious to non-conscious. This 
does not mean individuals are unaware of their actions – acting habitually does not mean that 
individuals perform behaviors as ‘non-thinking automatons’ (Chung et al., 2017), they are likely to be 
acutely aware of their actions – and their experiences may shed light on the processes that control them. 
The advances in the theory of habit for complex behaviors like physical activity, particularly the 
notion that habits for such behaviors comprise multiple sub-actions, some of which may be under 
deliberative control, some under automatic control, and that behaviors can be initiated or executed 
habitually, should be incorporated into definitions of habit. This will lead to better understanding and a 
less polarized view of habitual behaviors as automatic, non-conscious actions. Current definitions of 
habit emphasize the non-conscious component. According to Wood (2017), for example, “habits are 
implicit associations between contexts and responses that develop through repeated reward learning. 
When people act out of habit, the response is automatically triggered by perception of relevant context 
cues” (p. 389). Similarly, I defined habit, in accordance with ‘contemporary theory’, “as a specific 
action or behavioral tendency that is enacted with little conscious awareness or reflection, in response to 
a specific set of associated conditions or contextual cues” (Hagger, 2019, p. 119). In light of recent 
developments, the commentaries, and the arguments I outlined previously, I suggest that such 
definitions need revision to account for the ‘relativist’ position of habits. For example, I think such 
definitions would benefit from revisions to include Gardner’s (2019) suggestion that “any behaviour 
can be said to be habitually executed where habit plays some facilitating role. This allows for 
performances that are partly driven by habit, and partly consciously regulated” (p. 5). Qualifying 
definitions of habits with information on the relative control over actions by automatic and conscious 
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processes, and instigation and execution, may unify the definitions of habit with contemporary 
theoretical views. 
Habits, Behavioral Scripts, and Implicit Beliefs 
Related to the need to extend definitions of habits to encompass perspectives on habit as 
blended sets of actions that can be instigated or executed habitually, I also propose a need to recognize 
that habits are a particular or unique form of automaticity, but are also aligned with other sets of 
automatic processes that determine behavior. Habits are frequently described as goal independent and, 
therefore, separate from other implicit or non-conscious processes that lead to behavior, such as implicit 
goal activation, semantic priming, and behavioral scripts (Wood, 2017; Wood & Rünger, 2016). I 
propose that habits should not be viewed as entirely distinct from these other types of automatic 
responding, but as part of an overarching set of non-conscious, automatic processes. I contend that 
habits are likely to coincide with knowledge structures stored in associative memory, developed in 
conjunction with the habitual behavior, and include action representations, implicit evaluations of the 
behavior, and the sets of cues and contingencies that activate both the behavior and the sets of 
associated knowledge structures. This view seems to correspond with some of the perspectives on habit 
offered by other theorists (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Klöckner & Matthies, 2012), including those of 
Gardner et al. (2019) and Phillips (2019). As an example, I have outlined potential links between 
different non-conscious or automatic constructs, including action representations that often reflect 
habits, implicit beliefs, and cues or environmental factors (see Figure 1). 
There is conceptual and practical utility in isolating habits from other automatic processes, but it 
is also important to recognize that habits are likely to share common features and content with other 
processes. Identifying the commonalities in content between habits and other automatic processes, and 
how habits may relate to those processes, may provide further insight into the automatic determinants of 
action. It may also assist in further clarifying definitions of habits, what they encompass, and what 
processes covary with their development and presentation. Habits are proposed to be distinct from 
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automatic activation of goals or motivational cues, because such activation may activate multiple 
behavioral responses that service the goal, while links between cues and habitual behavioral responses 
are proposed to be invariant and independent of goals; cue-response links are, therefore, proposed to be 
behavior specific (Wood, 2017). Evidence for this comes from research demonstrating that individuals 
act in accordance with their habits but not in accordance with primed goals or intentions (Ji & Wood, 
2007; Neal, Wood, Labrecque, & Lally, 2012). Therefore, goal priming is likely to activate sets of 
specific goal-directed behaviors linked to fulfilling the goal, while cues to habits may be linked to 
specific behavioral responses and not dependent on goals. 
However, it seems unlikely that habitual behaviors are entirely independent of other implicit 
knowledge structures. This has been reflected in some perspectives on habit. For example, some 
theorists view habitual actions as a function of behavioral schema (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; 
Klöckner & Matthies, 2012). Schema are knowledge structures in which conceptually-related 
information is represented in associative memory, and are developed over time through experiences 
with the target concept (Abelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Behavioral schema link a given 
behavior with other information such as evaluations of the behavior, the goals or reasons for performing 
them, and the contexts and cues typically associated with its performance derived from experience (cf., 
Collins & Quillian, 1969). Such organizational structures may be instrumental in how individuals 
represent information and drive understanding of events and planning (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). The 
experience of a particular physical activity with positive evaluations or affective response may result in 
stored associations between the positive beliefs or affect and physical activity behavior in the schema. 
Similarly, if the activity is regularly experienced in conjunction with specific contexts, cues, or people, 
as in a habit, they too will likely to be represented in the schema. Therefore, the components of habits, 
specific cues and contexts, and the behavioral response are likely to be part of a more elaborate 
common knowledge structure and, therefore, associated with other implicitly-held information relating 
to the behavior in the form of a behavioral schema (see Figure 1). 
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The existence of schema opens up the possibility that habitual behaviors could be generated 
through other automatic processes, such as through the activation of conceptually-related information, 
like implicit attitudes or beliefs with respect to the behavior (Keatley, Clarke, & Hagger, 2012; 
Klöckner & Matthies, 2012; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). For example, activation of beliefs or attitudes 
toward particular behaviors may serve to initiate the behavior and set in motion the sequence of actions 
for the behavior to be observed at the macro level. In such cases, the same habitual behavior could be 
initiated through activation of different types of information held on the schema, either by cue/context-
response pairings or by activation of other associated information. There is also the intriguing 
possibility that the greater the behavioral automaticity, the more individuals are likely to act in 
accordance with their implicit attitudes. Recent research, for example, has demonstrated that implicit 
attitudes moderate relations between self-reported experience of habit and behavioral enactment 
(Phipps, Hagger, & Hamilton, 2019). In two studies, the interaction of habits measured by self-reported 
automaticity and implicit attitudes measured using an implicit association test (IAT) predicted health 
behaviors. Individuals with stronger habits were are more likely to have stronger implicit attitude-
behavior relations. Such research suggests that those for whom behaviors are habitual are more likely to 
act consistent with their implicit attitudes. This points to the possibility that as individuals’ behavior 
becomes more automatic, so implicit attitudes are developed and coincide with future action. 
Related to this, Gardner et al. (2019) provide an example of how habits themselves further 
promote the behavior through the development of implicit beliefs. He suggests that habitual execution 
of physical activity may lead to experiences of mastery and perceptions of self-efficacy in performing 
the behavior in future: “We hypothesise that habitual execution may impact on PA engagement via 
several mechanisms, including self-efficacy, affective judgements, and self-regulatory capacity” (p. 8). 
While such a process may have been intended to outline how habitual execution links with conscious 
deliberative processes that perpetuate behavior, it also suggests that habits may contribute to the 
development of implicit beliefs. For example, repeated experiences of a physical activity behavior 
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associated with positive evaluations (e.g., positive affective beliefs) may lead such evaluations being 
represented implicitly. For example, a recent study adopting a longitudinal panel design tested 
reciprocal effects of habits, past behavior, and implicit beliefs toward a health behavior (Hamilton, 
Phipps, Loxton, Modecki, & Hagger, 2019). In this study, self-report measures of habit and past 
behavior toward alcohol consumption, often used as a ‘proxy’ for habit (Hagger, Chan, Protogerou, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2016), and implicit alcohol identity measured using an IAT, were taken at two points in 
time, four weeks apart. Cross-lagged analyses controlling for covariance stability of constructs 
indicated reciprocal relations between habits and implicit identity, but the effect of habits on implicit 
identity was larger. Another study indicated that activation of such implicit beliefs may lead to 
concomitant activation of behavior (Conroy & Berry, 2017). Habits may, therefore, serve to perpetuate 
a particular behavior by contributing to the development of positive beliefs about the behavior. 
However, there is precious little research examining links between implicit cognition, 
information held schematically, and behaviors like physical activity. Future research should consider 
examining how experiencing behavior as habitual is associated with measures of implicit beliefs toward 
that behavior, and subsequent behavioral participation. It would also be important to test whether 
activating implicit beliefs with respect to a specific habitual behavior also instigates the behavior in the 
same way that presentation of the cues linked to that behavior. One way to do this would be to observe 
how implicit beliefs, measured using response latency tasks, develop as habits develop. It would also be 
useful to see how implicit beliefs, perhaps through evaluative priming, may serve to cue up a habitual 
behavior independent of the cues or contexts that typically cue up the behavior. This would provide 
clear evidence that habitual behaviors may be instigated by activating schema-related knowledge 
structures and by introducing the context or cues related to the behavior. 
Summary and Conclusion 
I commend Gardner et al. (2019) and Phillips (2019) for initiating this debate on the role of 
habits in physical activity. I agree with many of their points, particularly the need for redefining ideas 
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on habits, such as the nature of the conditions (e.g., cues and contexts) that may initiate behavior, and 
the need to consider complex behaviors like physical activity as comprised of multiple sub-behaviors 
that may be instigated or executed habitually, or through conscious processes. I contribute to this debate 
by calling for definitions of habits to incorporate these innovations and move away from a rigid 
perspective of habits as single behaviors that are entirely controlled by automatic processes. Extending 
this, I have suggested that habits need to be viewed in conjunction with other automatic processes. 
While it is useful to distinguish habits from other automatic processes, development, initiation, and 
enactment of habits is likely to be related to other automatic processes, such as implicit beliefs. I 
suggest that future investigation is needed to fully verify links between implicitly held constructs and 
habitual behaviors. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of how different non-conscious constructs for a behavior may be related. The behavior is depicted at the apex with 
associated constructs and memory structures represented below with increasing specificity. 
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